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ABSTRACT 
This work is aimed to contribute to the definition of the most adequate public actions –policies and laws- that are 
required to achieve an inclusive Information Society. It seems that such policies should be meant to grant full use of 
ICTs, but, whereas in developed societies these regulations should be enough, in the underdeveloped ones, the 
Information Society can only be discussed after the spreading of the ICTs, and this depends on the accuracy of policies 
aimed at impelling their diffusion. Considering that the Internet is a public good, we evaluate how the universal access to 
the net should be granted. Then, we analyze the more adequate legal policies for ICT, the Internet and the Information 
Society. We sum up that, in order to achieve an inclusive Information Society, the universal rights of access to and 
benefit of Internet for developing countries should be established at an international level. 
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 is devoted to the study of the legal frame of the Information Society and the impact 
of Information and Communication Technologies –ICT- in Small and Medium Enterprises –SME- in 
developing countries. The impact is measured using complex systems tools.  
In the legal area the study is aimed to contribute to the definition of the most adequate public actions –
policies and laws- that are required to achieve an inclusive Information Society. One of the key issues on this 
subject is how to guarantee a fair access to internet in developing countries. In order to answer this question 
we will focus on the ethical justification of ICT and Information Society Policies, taking into account the 
nature of internet as a global public good.  
In the field of the ICTs, we restrict our work to the Internet since the existing different information 
infrastructures are all merging into it -‘network of networks’, driven by ICT-convergence [Hilbert–Katz].  
 
2. ABOUT POLICIES AND THE NEED OF THEM 
                                               
1
 “Las PyMES entre las TICs y el Derecho” (SME between ICT and Law) –SPU/PI 11 J 072-.  Also “Marco jurídico, complejidad de la 
información y cuantificación del impacto en el uso de TICs” (Legal frame, information complexity and quantification of the impact of 
ICT in SME) -UNLP BID 1478/OC-AR – PICT N º 2-13533- sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank.- 
Despite the romanticized descriptions given in the early days of the Internet, the cyberspace shows a 
feudal character that emerges from the hierarchical privatization of its government associated with the 
granting of Internet domains. The hierarchical distribution of cyberfiefs means that, as in feudal society, 
every interest in cyberland is held from a superior computer operator who functions as lord over vassal or 
serf. Cyberlords exercise, therefore, the power of states as an incident of private property. Additionally, the 
Internet’s government, like that of a feudal society, is highly fragmented [Yen]. Whether this frightening 
scenario shall increase or improve is fully on law and policy makers’ hands. 
Most literature regarding the troublesome relationship between ICT and society points out that, in order 
to overcome the different problems it involves, certain policies are required. Being true, such a statement 
entirely lacks accuracy. Is it that the policies required are policies for ICT? Or should they rather be policies 
for the Information Society? 
 
2.1. Policies for ICT and the Information Society: ethical justification 
Which is the outcome of ‘Policies for ICT’ supposed to be? It seems that such policies should be meant 
to grant full use of these technologies by means of ruling their production, acquisition and use. Within 
developed societies, these regulations should be enough, and they certainly are. In the underdeveloped ones, 
on the other hand, the Information Society can only be discussed after the spreading of the ICTs, and this 
depends on the accuracy of policies aimed at impelling their diffusion. 
In most countries, and since the early days of the Internet, the actions of policymakers in this area have 
been focused in granting the universal access to the net. This universal access has been described as “a basic 
necessity, if not a right”, even though it seems to have been considered a low intensity right, since “Universal 
access can be further refined to mean that one member of every family anywhere has access to the Web for at 
least a short period every day or every week” [Ashfaq].  
We do agree that the universal access must be considered as a universal basic need. But we do not agree 
with a weak definition of need and a low intensity right. At this point, it is important to analyze briefly what 
does ‘basic needs’ mean here. According to Doyal, the meaning of ‘universal needs’ is that the harm caused 
by the absence of certain goods is the same for every human being. Basic needs are universalizable 
preconditions that allow the active participation of individual in the life style that they would choose if they 
had the opportunity to do so. In order for people to act and be responsible, they must have a certain physical 
and mental capability to do so. Thus, personal autonomy is a precondition for individuals’ action, 
independently of the culture to which they belong. To be autonomous in this minimal sense is to have the 
ability to make informed choices about what should be done and how to go about doing it. For critical 
autonomy to be a real possibility, individuals must have the opportunity to express both freedom of agency 
and political freedom [Doyal]. This is due to the fact that when we examine the notion of harm, we see that it 
commits us to the satisfaction of those goods that an individual needs so as not to be harmed, whether they 
are a primary product or not. It is also possible to consider harm as an obstacle to exercise a capacity and to 
its adequate function. But, what kind of good is the Internet?  
2.2. The nature of the Internet: a public good 
Internet is a public good, and the specification of this kind of good will not depend on the relative needs, 
individual preferences or market. If we accept a relative concept of needs we would allow them to be 
determined by market preferences, as well as by asymmetric relationships between private companies and the 
subject-object of the agreements. If we support an impartial allocation criterion of universal justice, we 
guarantee universal access to this benefit in order to satisfy basic needs –absolute needs-. This does not imply 
restricting priorities allocation criteria for communities, "While the basic individual needs and autonomy are 
universal, many goods and services required to satisfy these needs are culturally variable" [Doyal] 
How could universal access to the net be granted? Such a guarantee can only lay on a strong and 
courageous definition.  As we have mentioned before, the Internet is a public and not a private good. If 
information and knowledge are considered public goods –this is, the kind of goods that are available to 
everybody to benefit from them-, then the Internet is a public good. 
Now, if we analyze the problem in terms of the Information Society, particularly in an inclusive 
Information Society, then the Internet should be considered a global public good. Global public goods are 
goods that exhibit a significant degree of public character (non- excludability and non-rivalry) across natural 
boundaries. Knowledge is commonly regarded as the archetypical public good. It is available to everyone to 
benefit from it and one person benefiting from it does not prevent another one from benefiting too. (Note that 
there is a wide range of "impure public goods", for example where technology can introduce 
excludability such as encryption of two broadcast signals). A more technical definition of global public goods 
is, therefore, that they are the kind of goods "which it is rational, from the perspective of a group of nations 
collectively, to produce for universal consumption, and for which it is irrational to exclude an individual 
nation from its consumption, irrespective of whether that nation contributes to its financing" [Woodward-
Smith] 
2.2.1. The access to the Internet 
Coming back to the problem of the equal access to the Internet, at the present moment there is a great 
inequality between rich and poor countries as regards the direction and priorities of the distribution and 
access to the Internet services. Justice considerations commit us to allocate benefit according to needs. 
People in a given society have a basic right to equal opportunity, and access to knowledge and services plays 
an important role in sustaining that equality [Rawls]. Scientific and educative services are different from 
other commodities. Future societies will be based on knowledge; therefore, research efforts should promote 
universal access to it -including developing countries-. All citizens share a common interest for a prudent use 
of patents and the commercialization of products; in view of the high cost of technology and the difficult to 
allocate all benefits on an equal basis, our duty is to use an allocation criterion that will not discriminate in 
terms of irrelevant moral reasons -such as gender, race, social conditions, etc- , i.e., a criterion that allows us 
to distribute the benefit in an impartial way, aiming at “equality of opportunities”. 
One suggested distributive criterion is the difference principle of Rawls, but it proves to have several 
problems; likewise, considering the access to Internet and computers in developing countries a low intensity 
right is not enough. In order to understand this ideal criterion introduced by Rawls, we must accept that 
inequalities will only be tolerated to the extent that they benefit the least well-off through leading to the 
provision of those goods and services that are necessary for the optimization of basic needs satisfaction.  In 
other words, it implies compensating in favor of the "worst off group" because there are moral obligations to 
compensate for natural and social disadvantages.
 
Now the problem is how should “worst off group” (natural, 
social) be defined, and of course, how to balance between efficiency and equality if we only benefit the 
“worst off group”. We do not have a real criterion for distribution in an underdeveloped country, since this 
criterion supposed a democratic and moderate scarce society. 
In our opinion, the criterion of justice must be based on the universal obligation to satisfy basic and 
absolute needs for the development of basic capabilities. In order to balance inequalities and allow a fair 
equality of opportunities, the mere guarantee of the equal access to the computers and bonus for Internet is 
not enough. To have access both to the computer, to the know-how and to the knowledge as well as to be 
able to develop equal capabilities to contribute to a balance in an integral context (access to education, health 
care, etc) is a requirement. Therefore, moral obligations are not only applied to individuals, but also to 
Institutions and/or Organizations. "The right is not effectual by itself but only in relation to the obligation" 
[O¨Neill] According to Onora O´Neill, the moral imperative is applied to Institutions because these have 
moral obligations and duties towards individuals whose moral and legal rights are infringed by denying them 
access to service or not satisfying their universal basic needs. 
2.3. Legal policies for ICT, the Internet and the Information Society 
The discussion about legal policies must be carried along different channels, depending on the level of 
development of a given country or organization. In most developed countries and among the mayor 
corporations it takes place in the field of Intellectual Property. They argue about patents and licenses, if 
software patents are a useful way to protect software or copyright protection is sufficient, if government 
should use proprietary software or open source software, and so on. They are talking about how to manage, 
administer and appropriate the benefits of their technological knowledge.  
In most underdeveloped countries, on the other hand, law’s concern seems to be restricted to the regulation 
of communications –an area where many of those mayor corporations are much concerned- and, in some of 
them, the legal tools e-business demands, like e-signature. Whether to use open source software in the public 
sector or not, for instance, seems to be a problem for scarce civil servants and scientists in a few of these 
countries –i.e. Brazil [ALADI]-. No firm, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, is likely to be 
found developing open source software; they cannot afford the costs involved in it, not only in the software 
itself, but also in the employees training.  
Everybody is concerned about privacy and security in the net but, once more, the extension and depth of 
those rights is different for developed and developing societies.  
Therefore, there is not ‘a’ legal policy for ICT, the Internet and the Information Society, but as many 
different policies as diverse socio-economic scenarios; moreover being the socio-economic scenarios equal, 
the different legal systems in one and the other might drive to different policies.  
2.3.1. Where to? 
Actors within the legal system should be thinking in a revolution. In fact, it has been stated that the 
Information Society shall only be possible after a juridical revolution [Olivera-Proto]. But, in the meantime 
something must be done. Electronic invoice, e signature, e document, e copy are tools used by those that are 
already ‘in’ the Information Society. Likewise Intellectual Property, it is mainly a problem for people that 
are, not only ‘in’, but impelling the technological development in the Information Society.  
When the time of decisions about these legal policies comes –and it is now-, policy and law makers shall 
have to decide if they are going either to protect the rights of those that are already in the Information Society 
and, on doing so, deepen the digital divide or to work for an inclusive Information Society, shaping a legal 
frame that allows easy and legally useful interaction among social actors. 
Action demands the implementation of specific requirements. "Transitions from more abstract to more 
determinate act descriptions are crucial for any process of practical deliberation" [O’Neill]. Bridging the 
technology gap and the digital divide claims for a change in the rules of the game -rules imposed by the 
market model by means of deception and coercion-. The theory of obligation focuses on action, and this 
action is the moral obligation of agents and Institutions [O’Neill]. If we intend to claim for a 
Multidisciplinary Agenda, with priorities of action, we need to perform them as positive actions, controlling 
their fulfillment and impact on equal opportunities. Summing up, "the only way of integrating positive and 
negative freedom will be through the optimal satisfaction of basic needs. This is why moral right must be 
translated into constitutional rights guaranteed by public authority [Doyal]". 
2.3.2. In the field of Public Law 
By now, the time when the Western Frontier metaphor operated as propaganda supporting minimal 
regulation of the Internet [Yen] looks too far away and long ago. The very few documents that face the legal 
aspects involved in the relationship between ICTs and firms are likely to analyze the regulatory frameworks. 
This is, from the field of public law, it is neither the general interest, nor the interest of the “worst off group”, 
but the rights of the Internet Services Providers (ISP) that are being protected. The Feudal Society metaphor, 
on the other hand, forecasts a very complicated future for the denizens of a cyberspace dominated by 
unregulated private ordering. The Feudal Society metaphor shows that ISPs will try to create, maintain, and 
exploit barriers to user exit because those barriers increase the value of cyberfiefs [Yen]. 
In order to shape a coherent legal policy for the Information Society, it should be decided if the Internet 
might be included among either the ‘public services’ or the services ‘in the public interest’, or if it is a 
“universal service”. If it cannot be included in any of these categories, then it is a private service; therefore 
the Internet should not be regulated at all. 
As a result of the precedent theoretical and conceptual analysis, we consider that the universal rights of 
access to and benefit of Internet for developing countries should be established at an international level. An 
international treaty, resulting from a deliberative and democratic process -that would, for instance, take place 
at the World Summit for the Information Society (WSIS)-, would guarantee fair access and transfer of 
technology, as well as preventing ethical and legal consequences of information’s misuse. If the access to 
knowledge is in danger because of the private sector’s lack of responsibility, an international organization -
through treaties and agreements signed by the states- should apply universal and effective rules for the 
control and balance between the growing commercial interest, and the shared human interest of environment, 
as well as the social and economic concern of developing countries. Such a treaty should not imply 
interference with sovereignty or with the right of each and all countries to establish their own law and their 
own development priorities, as it is currently the case; it will contribute to harmonize the access to a common 
and public good on the basis of universal principles that have been historically accepted by all countries 
(such as they were in TRIPS, OMC, TLC, Cartagena Protocol). 
3. CONCLUSION 
As it regards the Internet and the Information Society, we are presenting the conflict between the market 
model (Internet as a private good) and a universal and equality model (Internet as a public good), making it 
clear that there are moral obligations to change the rules of the game in favor of an equal model for the 
humanity.  
Therefore, we are all in a pivotal moment. We have the moral universal obligation to exclude the slavery of 
the new world; to recognize the right of each human being to be recognized as a ‘goal in himself’, to satisfy 
universal basic needs, to participate in and give consent to the creation of social and universal laws. All of 
these are human rights that are being infringed by denying the persons´ autonomy for the benefit of the 
market. The growing vulnerability of human beings is a consequence of allowing market interest to invade 
areas that do not belong to the market model, i.e. moral, social, public policy, law and, above all,  human life. 
The impartial allocation criterion commits us to focus on universal needs because the non satisfaction of 
basic needs implies a harm due to not having access to the common goods. In that sense, developing 
countries have the right to be active members of an inclusive Information Society, to have access to the 
knowledge, technology and products obtained from the use of Internet. If we do not allow them access to 
such benefits, we are causing serious damage to people in developing countries, deepening the inequalities by 
the creation of new inequalities.  
At this point it is important to understand that to guarantee access to knowledge and technology is an 
obligation, and that an inclusive and integrated Information Society demands its legal frame to be shaped by 
general rules –laws- based on ethics. 
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